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Abstract. Authorised users (insiders) are behind the majority of secu-
rity incidents with high financial impacts. Because authorisation is the
process of controlling users’ access to resources, improving authorisation
techniques may mitigate the insider threat. Current approaches to au-
thorisation suffer from the assumption that users will (can) not depart
from the expected behaviour implicit in the authorisation policy. In re-
ality however, users can and do depart from the canonical behaviour.
This paper argues that the conflict of interest between insiders and au-
thorisation mechanisms is analogous to the subset of problems formally
studied in the field of game theory. It proposes a game theoretic autho-
risation model that can ensure users’ potential misuse of a resource is
explicitly considered while making an authorisation decision. The result-
ing authorisation model is dynamic in the sense that its access decisions
vary according to the changes in explicit factors that influence the cost
of misuse for both the authorisation mechanism and the insider.
1 Introduction
The three well known cornerstones of information security are confidentiality,
integrity and availability. Each of these properties is defined by reference to an
exogenous notion of authorised. For instance, confidentiality (integrity) is pre-
served if and only if a resource is read (modified) by an authorised user. There-
fore, the complexity of preserving information security is directly dependant on
authorisation, which is the process of mediating every requested access to re-
sources maintained by the system and determining whether the request should
be authorised or denied.
Authorisation proves to be a complex task in practice. It is based on a pre-
diction of the users who may require access to resources to perform a job, while
the correctness of this prediction appears to be inherently dependant on the
future behaviour of the user. Despite this, all existing authorisation approaches
inherently attempt to predict both the system’s future needs (i.e., to determine
who needs access) and the future user behaviour (i.e., in terms of the satisfac-
tion of the need). To make the problem tractable, so far these two concepts
have been conflated into a single construct. For example, in Multilevel Security
(MLS) users are assigned clearances, or in Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
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to roles. Inherent in both of these assignments is the concept of ‘need’ and to
some extent ‘user’s behaviour’ (i.e., if users were assumed to misuse their access,
they wouldn’t be assigned to the role or been given the clearance). Authorisation
decisions within these approaches are based on a security policy, that constitutes
a set of rules binding access rights to users on the basis of need and assumed
unlikelihood of misuse. The main shortcoming of the current policy-based ap-
proaches is their use of static criteria to determine a dynamic phenomena: future
needs and future users’ behaviour3.
The adverse implication of this is significant as is discussed below under two
streams of criticism, one arguing for more flexible authorisation models, another
for an optimal access rights assignment. First, there is evidence suggesting that
static policy may not be effective in today’s dynamic environment [12,14]. As a
result, a user’s legitimate access request to perform a job that is beneficial for
the organisation will be rejected. To address some of the rigidity of such autho-
risation models, risk-based approaches have been proposed [12,4,14], where an
unauthorised user may be given access to resources when the risk of doing so is
estimated to be below a predefined threshold. Second, there are industry surveys
suggesting that a significant portion of security incidents are due to authorised
users (insiders) [6]. There are several proposals to detect and prevent insider mis-
use by inferring user’s intention through behavioural indicators captured using
intrusion detection or computer forensic techniques [15,13,3].
Our research is motivated by the gap between these two perspectives: one
identifies the need for more flexible authorisation models to facilitate resource
sharing in dynamic environments. The other suggests, even with the current
pessimistic rights assignment, misuse remains commonplace. At the heart of
both lies the uncertainty about future behaviour of users. Such uncertainty is
traditionally buried under an informal tradeoff analysis a priori to constructing
an authorisation policy. Our goal is to make this tradeoff a dynamic decision
based on explicit factors. To this end, we believe authorisation is in nature close
to the principal-agent problem in the field of economics [7]. The theory has
been extended to discuss the issues of delegation, especially the incentives of
employers (principals) and employees (agents) to invest effort into finding the
most profitable ways of using employer’s resources if incentives are not, or are
only partially aligned [1], a problem very similar to that of authorisation, where
not to authorise a legitimate request implies that the employer has to spend
additional effort to carry out the job. The implication of this perspective is
profound for authorisation. It suggests that users are to be considered as self-
interested; they attempt to increase their objective function without caring about
the objectives of the authorisation system. Therefore, it is no longer sensible to
assume users’ behaviour based purely on constructs such as role, clearance or
trustworthiness. For instance, a high clearance user may be more likely to misuse
an access right when he is confident that it can go undetected. Whilst, a low
3 In authorisation literature, user’s compliance with policy is external to the authori-
sation model - assumption has been the existence of policy enforcement mechanisms.
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clearance user may be less likely to misuse the same access right when she is
certain about being detected and the punishment that follows.
To formally reason about potential user behaviour while making authori-
sation decisions we utilise techniques from game theory [5] which provide a
mathematical foundation for reasoning about conflicts of interest between ra-
tional self-interested individuals. The principal contribution of this paper is the
proposal of a formal game theoretic authorisation model. In this paper we de-
liberately introduce strong assumptions to emphasize the effectiveness of this
novel approach. We introduce four types of users that an authorisation system
may be interacting with, namely, benevolent, malicious, selfish and inadvertent.
The type of a user defines their objective function. Further, we show that given
a selfish user, under some strong assumptions, the authorisation decision is re-
duced to solving an inequality, representing the user’s tradeoff about the misuse
of a resource.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
work, focusing on those employing game theoretic techniques in information se-
curity. Section 3 introduces the authorisation problem and narrows the scope of
our work. Section 4 presents a game theoretic authorisation model and briefly
discusses the implications of Nash equilibrium for such model. Section 6 enu-
merates the simplifying assumptions made in this paper and outlines possible
directions for future work. Finally, Section 7 provides the concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
The marriage between economics and information security has attracted con-
siderable attention recently. Game theory provides a mathematical framework
for studying the behaviour of rational agents in a multi-player decision problem
where players with different objectives can compete and interact with each other
on the same system to increase their objective function. The use of game theory
in modelling the interaction between users within a system has appeared in sev-
eral areas of information security research, though not explicitly in addressing
the authorisation problem.
Liu et al., in [10] suggest that the concept of incentives can be employed
to express attackers’ intentions, while the concept of utilities may be used to
integrate incentives and costs in such a way that the system as well as attack-
ers’ objectives can be practically modelled. They introduce a conceptual model
for determining attacker intent, objectives and strategies rather than using a
specific type of game for modelling attacks; further they introduce conditions
under which a specific type of game model will be feasible and desirable. Alpcan
and Basar in [2] have also investigated a security game as a two player, non-
cooperative, non-zero-sum game. Their work is related to ours as the game is
assumed to be a complete information game and the player’s optimal strategy
depends only on the payoff function of the opponent. Lye et al., [16] has shown
how the network security problem can be modelled as a general-sum stochastic
game between attacker and the administrator. They also showed how to compute
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Nash equilibria, however, their approach is specific to network security applica-
tions and they assume the benefit of attackers arises from harming the network,
hence only dealing with malicious users. In [11] the authors introduce some of
the problems in performing tradeoff analysis in network security. They formulate
both static and dynamic Bayesian games to demonstrate the suitability of game
theory for the development of various control algorithms in intrusion detection.
Further, they discuss the existence of Nash equilibria for these games. However,
like [16], they only deal with potentially malicious users, who may only have a
positive payoff through attacking the system.
In [9], Liu et al. introduce stochastic game theoretic model for the analysis of
the behaviour of malicious insiders. They suggest such a game to be a zero-sum
game, where the loss of the employer is the gain of the insider. However, the
zero-sum assumption is restrictive as most security games are non-zero sum [11].
Further, their model only deals with malicious insiders. It ignores the circum-
stances where an insider may also benefit from not attacking, which is the case
for selfish insiders as will be discussed in this paper.
In another work, Liu et al., [8] propose a risk-based approach to deal with
inadvertent insiders, those users who do not deliberately intend to harm the
system. They propose assigning a risk budget to tasks and rewarding those em-
ployees who perform their tasks while consuming less than the allocated budget.
The reward value is equal to the remaining risk tokens for the task. On the other
hand, those employees who consume all their risk budget before completing their
job are punished. In this way, the risk is communicated to the inadvertent insiders
and the cost of risky actions is shifted from the organisation to them. However,
the proposed approach is not abstract and falls short of a formal model. Fur-
ther, they assume the punishment of the users is a certainty, when in reality
punishment is a function of the ability to both detect an attack and administer
punishment, neither of which is certain. They also assume the benefit to the
user from misusing a resource is less than the punishment cost which implies the
punishment is assumed to always be an effective deterrent.
The focus of our work is specifically on authorisation, where the users are not
necessarily adversaries. This makes our problem distinct from the above works,
because users’ benefit is not always driven from attacking, as the organisation
may reward actions that advance its objectives. Further, sometimes the expected
cost of denying access exceeds the expected cost of authorising the access. This
is contrary to the underlying belief behind existing authorisation approaches
where the cost of denying access is not accounted for within the model. To the
best of our knowledge, all the existing approaches to authorisation make implicit
assumptions about how users will behave rather than explicitly reasoning about
the users’ use/misuse of resources.
3 Authorisation Problem
Let I, A,R, P respectively denote a set of all Individuals, Actions, Resources and
Purposes in a system. We say U = I × A × R × P is a set of all the possible
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uses - all the actions that can be performed by individuals on resources for any
purpose. Given this, the authorisation problem revolves around the design of an
authorisation function that determines a subset of uses, A+ = {(i, a, r, p)} ⊆ U,
referred to as the authorised space.
The aim of the authorisation function is to reduce the probability of an
attack, that is defined as a user’s action on a resource for a purpose other than
for which the user was authorised. Formally, a usage (i, a, r, p′) is an attack by
user i if ∀a, r, p ∈ U, ∃(i, a, r, p) ∈ A+ ∧ ∄(i, a, r, p′) ∈ A+. By definition our
authorisation problem is focusing on the scenarios where resources provided to
users may be used for purposes other than those intended by the authorisation
system. For instance, Alice using her access permission to copy sensitive records
for the purpose of financial benefit (by selling them) is considered as an attack.
An attack inherently suggests an unwelcome usage by the user regardless
of the potential damage they may incur to the system. From this, we define a
user threat (threat for short) as a probability ρ ∈ [0, 1] of attack by a user. This
expresses the unpredictability of the users’ actual purpose of using the resource.
3.1 Insider Types
One of the major complexities involved in dealing with users’ attacks is the fact
that such attacks may be intentional as well as accidental. The former may occur
for reasons such as revenge, financial gain, policy workarounds, and the latter
may be an honest mistake or due to a user’s lack of knowledge about the risk of
their actions for the organisation [13]. Even though knowledge about intentions
provides an important criteria for detecting and preventing attacks, teasing out
intentions is a challenging task as there are no uniquely identifying indicators
associated with attack actions [10]. Despite this, there are already several tools
and approaches for detecting attacks as well as predicting them based on be-
havioural patterns and sequences of actions executed by a user. Although such
tools are still in their infancy, the empirical results show several signs of improve-
ment. For instance, Bishop et al., in [3] introduced an architecture for a tool that
attempts to identify certain behavioural changes that may be alarming. Others
[15] have suggested the use of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to identify the
deviations from “normal” usage patterns by users.
Here we assume such a tool exists as a function Γ{Θ} ∈ [0, 1] that provides a
probability of user’s type, given a type space Θ = {benevolent , selfish,malicious ,-
inadvertent}. For example, ΓΘ = {0, 0.5, 0.5, 0} suggests that that a given user
might be either selfish or malicious with the probability of 1/2. A user’s type
embodies their private information that is relevant to both the user and the
authorisation mechanism - each user type specifies what the user considers a
utility, hence their intention:
Malicious: those who consider the loss (increased cost) of the organisation as
their gain. They would like to incur as much cost to the organisation as possi-
ble. Most of the existing works deal with detecting and preventing malicious
insiders [9].
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Selfish: those whose aim is to maximise their own (financial) payoff. Their aim
is not to incur cost to the organisation, even though this may happen as a
result of their selfish choices. Hence, this type will respond to appropriate
incentives (e.g., financial).
Benevolent: those who consider the loss of the organisation their loss (their
utility function is the organisation’s utility function), hence they do not
attack.
Inadvertent: those with incomplete or incorrect information about the outcome
of their actions. They are not misusing the resources (attack) to harm the
organisation or doing so to increase their financial gain, but they may be
careless or negligent or uninformed [8].
While our ultimate goal is to design a general authorisation model that can
make an optimum authorisation decision (i.e., to reduce threat) under uncer-
tainty about user’s type, here for simplicity we will assume that for a given
user the sum of her/his type probabilities is 1 and that users are only selfish
(ΓΘ = {0, 1, 0, 0}). This focuses our attention on how to design an authorisation
mechanism that explicitly takes into account (selfish) user’s potential misuses of
their access rights before making authorisation decisions.
4 Game Theoretic Authorisation Mechanism
In this section we formulate an authorisation mechanism as a game between a
selfish employee (i) and the benevolent employer (j) who is the sole authority
in making authorisation decisions. The game starts with a request from the
employee for access to a resource. Along with the request, the employee indicates
the outcome of such action for the employer, denoted as proposal (p)4. Given this
request, the employer shall decide whether to authorise or deny the access to the
resource5. On the other hand, the strategy space of the employee consists of
either attack or not attack.
Such a binary description of employees’ alternatives simplifies our model,
however, it is no longer possible to differentiate attacks based on their conse-
quences. For instance, given a sensitive record and a disgruntled employee with
two alternative attack actions, i.e., destroy or sell the record to competitors,
there may be a great difference between the two attacks from the employer’s
perspective, particularly if a backup of the record exists (i.e., selling it may
incur a great financial loss while destroying it may merely interrupt a service).
The authorisation game centres around a resource valuable to both players.
An employee may use the resource to either make a personal profit (i.e., attack)
or perform a job that actions the proposal (p) for the employer. The employer,
4 We deliberately reuse p that represented a purpose in Section 3 to draw the connec-
tion between the notion of proposal and purpose.
5 The employer is actually the representation of our authorisation function, that
given an access request (i, a, r, p) ∈ U decides whether (i, a, r, p) ∈ A+ (authorise) or
(i, a, r, p) /∈ A+ (deny) the request.
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hence, is concerned about the expected cost of the attack, which causes the re-
source to transition from a secure state to a compromised state. Such a transition
is associated with a specific monetary cost for the employer, denoted by Crj . De-
pending on the resource the cost of being compromised changes. In reality there
may be several compromised states including loss of confidentiality, integrity,
availability, privacy or reputation. Further, as we have mentioned, there may
be several attacks based on the employee’s action space and each may incur a
specific cost depending on the causal relationship between an attack action and
resource transition to a costly state. However, since attack generalises any sin-
gle/sequence of undesirable employee actions, we assume an employee’s attack
incurs a cost (Crj ) to the employer.
The employer is also susceptible to opportunity cost: the benefit forgone by
denying a request. The quantification of opportunity is determined by the pro-
posal (p) made by the employee to access the resource. Through such a formu-
lation, distinct from the existing authorisation approaches, denying an access
request as well as authorising it may incur a cost for the authorisation system.
Now we turn to the employee’s cost factors. An employee may incur cost
through fines, denoted by Cfi (i.e., given they attack). However, usually a fine is
not certain - it is only applicable if the employer can detect the attack, which is
a function of the accuracy of detection techniques and the ability to enforce the
fine. For now the ability to detect and enforce the fine is combined and referred
to as the probability of being fined, denoted by ψ ∈ [0, 1], which is assumed to be
common knowledge. For example, when an employee is out-sourced from another
country there may be less chance of enforcement of the fine in comparison to a
circumstance when the employee is local6. In addition, in order to attack, the em-
ployee is assumed to incur a preparation cost, denoted by Cti . This cost abstracts
the effort the employee must expend in order to acquire access to the resource to
use it for personal benefit. For instance, if the resource is commercially valuable,
finding a buyer requires time and effort. In other cases, the employee may need
to prove to the employer that the proposal amount is attainable by him and this
could require training courses and faking trustworthiness.
Sometimes the employee is given a personal benefit for the opportunity they
realise. This is represented as a rate of return, ǫ ∈ [0, 1] on the proposed op-
portunity, p. We regard the predictions of the employee in terms of the actual
achievement of p to be always correct if the access is granted. On the other hand,
the actual personal profit for the employee from an attack is a portion α ∈ [0, 1],
of the cost of resource (Crj ), if the access is given. Note that this may not always
be the case as sometimes a very costly resource for the employer has a very low
value for a selfish employee or vice versa.
Given the above game setting, the game tree of employer and employee in
an authorisation game is shown in Figure 4. The authorisation problem is, given
complete information of both players about the payoffs, when should the em-
ployer authorise the access?
6 For now we are not interested in the size of this fine in proportion to the loss (cost)
of the employer.
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denyauthorise
j
notattack
p, ǫ.p
attack
ψC
f
i
− (1− ψ)Crj ,
(1− ψ)α.Crj − C
t
i − ψ.C
f
i
notattack
0, 0
attack
0,−Cti
i
Fig. 1. Players Payoffs
4.1 Nash Equilibrium and its Implications
A solution to a non-cooperative game predicts certain strategy profiles as out-
comes of the game. Defining or interpreting a solution revolves around how
players reason and behave or are believed to reason and behave. This inevitably
leads to the need for players to attempt to understand and predict how the other
player will behave. In a game of complete information, where the strategies and
payoffs are common knowledge, this is then reduced to players choosing their
best responses to the potential strategy of others. The well known concept of
Nash equilibrium [5] provides an exit from a cycle of speculations as to what
strategies the players should use, and provides an appropriate solution for the
game. In the context of the proposed authorisation game, Nash equilibrium can
be defined as a set of actions from the employee and the employer such that
none of them has any incentive to deviate from their chosen action.
Assuming that the employer always takes the pure strategy deny, then the
employee’s best response is not attack. However, this is not an equilibrium as
the pure strategy of not attack by the employee motivates the rational employer
to change his strategy to authorise whenever p > 0. By switching to authorise,
the employee is then inclined to attack when
ǫ.p < (1− ψ)α.Crj − ψ.C
f
i − C
t
i . (1)
Conversely, this can be reduced to the following: if the employer authorises
then the employee does not attack if and only if
ǫ.p ≥ (1− ψ)α.Crj − ψ.C
f
i − C
t
i . (2)
The above finding is interesting and rather counter intuitive in the context of
authorisation. It suggests that in making an authorisation decision the authori-
sation mechanism may only need to focus on the employee’s payoff instead of its
own. This is contrary to the existing approaches to authorisation, where there
exists a policy, assumed to incorporate access rules which result from a trade-
off analysis between some implicit contextual factors, for all current and future
requests. Here instead, the decision factors are explicit and abstract enough to
adapt to the required application. For example, the value of ψ can depend on the
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existing monitoring techniques, audit, accuracy of forensic techniques, physical
security employed, etc.
On the other hand, the application of such an authorisation model can in-
troduce a prescriptive system rather than simply providing authorise/deny re-
sponses. Through such an interpretation, given an authorisation request, a game
theoretic authorisation model may also attempt to meet the above inequality,
if not already met, through taking either or a combination of deterrence or ap-
peasement policies. The former is to increase the cost of attacking for the user,
so that the above inequality is met. This may be achieved through either in-
creasing any or combination of ψ, Cti , C
f
i , or reducing α. On the other hand the
appeasement policy attempts to increase the benefit for not attacking, by align-
ing users’ utility function with the organisation through increasing ǫ. A thorough
investigation of how such policies can be implemented is left for future work.
5 Case based Analysis of Authorisation Mechanism
In this section we will introduce two authorisation cases and compare a decision
made under a traditional authorisation model (e.g., RBAC) to the potential
decision from a game theoretic authorisation mechanism.
5.1 Case 1: Less Valuable Resource
Consider a hypothetical organisation with a role-based access control framework
in place and an employee who requests to use a resource (e.g., printer), to which
she does not currently have access. An RBAC model simply denies the request
without considering the payoffs to the employee from misusing the printer or the
payoffs to the organisation when the access is authorise/denied. Let us describe
how a game theoretic authorisation model analyses the potential responses, given
the following inputs7:
α = 1 private benefit ratio of a resource value
Crj = 1 the cost of printing a document for organisation
ǫ = 0 interest given to employee
C
f
i
= 1 punishment cost if resource misused
ψ = 1 detection rate (e.g., through print logs)
Cti = 0 cost of preparation for using printer for personal purposes
p = 1 value of opportunity proposed (e.g., time saved)
Given the above setting the payoff for both the employee and the employer
would be as shown in Figure 2. It can be seen that for the employee the rational
choice regardless of the employer’s action is not attack, and for the employer,
authorising the request weakly dominates denying it, hence the pair (authorise,
not attack) is the equilibrium state. This case exemplifies the authorisation dy-
namics for resources with a small intrinsic value, where misuses could also be
easily detected.
7 Note that the above representation of costs and punishment are ordinal numbers
rather than cardinal. Hence, they show the relationship between the factors rather
than their actual quantity.
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Employer
Employee
attack notattack
authorise 1,−1 1, 0
deny 0, 0 0, 0
Fig. 2. Less valuable resource and high chance of punishment
5.2 Case 2: Highly Valuable Resource
Consider a scenario where an employee of a financial firm makes stock forecasts
based on some highly valuable information resources. Due to the importance of
these resources, each employee only has access to a segment of the information.
However, let us assume, an employee observes a good opportunity to invest in
a stock, but needs some more information, which he does not have access to.
Again, traditional access control models simply deny such access on the basis of
their predefined policy. Let us first analyse the circumstance under the following
inputs.
α = 1 ratio of return from selling the resource
Crj = 10 the cost of selling the document to competitors
ǫ = 0 employee’s interest for achieving opportunity
C
f
i
= 10 the cost of punishment
ψ = .25 attack detection rate
Cti = 1 low attack preparation is needed
p = 3 value of opportunity proposed
Again, given the above setting the payoff for both the employee and the
employer would be as shown in Figure 3.
Employer
Employee
attack notattack
authorise −5, 4 3, 0
deny 0,−1 0, 0
Fig. 3. Valuable resource and low chance of punishment
Given the above payoffs there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. This is be-
cause, if the employer chooses to authorise, the employee will rationally choose
to attack in which case the employer switches to deny. However, when the em-
ployer chooses the pure strategy deny, then the response of the employee is not
attack. Although there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, in this authorisation
problem an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists: both employer and employee
randomise between their pure strategies. The employer will correctly predict the
employee’s probabilities of possible actions, and vice versa. These probabilities
make both players indifferent in choosing between their pure strategies option,
thus randomizing is rational for both of them. For example, in Figure 3, if we
denote by β the probability of the employer to authorise and by ρ the proba-
bility of the employee to attack, we get a mixed equilibrium for the game when
β = 1/5, ρ = 3/88. Given this, to prevent an attack, the authorisation mechanism
authorises a request only if it believes ρ < 3/8.
8 For details on mixed strategy equilibrium refer to the Chapter 1 of Fludenberg and
Tirole’s book [5].
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In this case, the key factors behind the employee’s decision to attack are
the ability to monetize the valuable resource, as well as the small probability
of punishment (ψ = 0.25), for instance because the employee is leaving the
organisation. However, given the same scenario, this decision can swiftly change
by the change in the probability of enforcing the punishment (Cfi ). For example,
now assume that ψ = .75, to say the chance that the employer can enforce the
punishment is high. Everything else being equal, we get the payoffs in Figure 4.
Employer
Employee
attack notattack
authorise 5,−6 3, 0
deny 0,−1 0, 0
Fig. 4. Valuable resource and high chance of punishment
Hence, the rational action for the authorisation system in this circumstance
is to authorise the access, even though the resource is sensitive and its misuse is
costly. This is because the payoff of the employee reveals that attacking is not
the rational choice, as the pair (3,0) is the equilibrium.
6 Future Work
In this paper we have made several simplifying assumptions to flag the potential
manner of employment and benefits of game theoretic techniques in design-
ing new authorisation mechanisms. So, our immediate efforts to improve the
proposed abstract model focus on relaxing some of our assumptions: First, em-
ployer’s complete information about user’s type. In reality, the predication of a
type involves uncertainty in the form of a probability distribution over types. Sec-
ond, users alternative actions were modelled as binary, e.g., attack or not-attack.
However, in reality a user may have several different attack alternatives which
vary in likelihood as well as consequence. Finally, a more realistic authorisation
mechanism may need to be modelled as a dynamic game rather than a one-shot
static game. In dynamic games, players observe other players’ behaviours and
modify their strategies accordingly.
7 Conclusion
This paper discusses the authorisation problem and proposes a new paradigm
of thinking for designing dynamic authorisation models. It suggests that the
problem of authorisation is at it’s core analogous to the principal and agent
problem studied in the field of game theory. Based on this premise, it proposes the
preliminary components and a basic but novel authorisation model that makes
access decisions based on explicit reasoning about users available actions and the
likelihood and consequences of choosing such actions, both for the authoriser and
the user. Finally, it provides some extreme authorisation cases to illustrate the
12 Farzad Salim et al.
advantages of such a new authorisation model in comparison to the existing
well-known authorisation models such as RBAC.
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